Case Study: Harold Shipman

Case Study: Harold Shipman Shipman began practicing as a doctor in 1974, at the Abraham Ormerod Medical Practice in Todmorden. He was there until 1975 when his partners discovered that he had been obtaining drugs dishonestly for his own use. In 1976 he pleaded guilty to three offences of obtaining pethidine by deception, three offences of unlawful possession of pethidine and two further offences of forging a prescription he was sentenced in Halifax Magistrates court to pay a fine and compensation. In August 1992,he began working as a solo practitioner at a surgery in Hyde he continued to work as a single-handed practitioner until his arrest in September 1998. In July 1998 the Greater Manchester Police began an inquiry into Kathleen Grundys death, a patient of Dr Shipman, the inquiry was rapidly widened to include the deaths of Shipmans other patients. On Monday, 31st January 2000 the jury at Preston Crown Court convicted Harold Shipman of 15 murders and of forging a will. Case Study Mrs Kathleen Grundy was a widow and lived by herself she was in remarkably good health for her age. She undertook work for many Charitable organisations and had a healthy social life. She spent the evening before her death with a friend and was in normal health when she went home. Mrs Grundy died on 24th June 1998 at the age of 81. Shipman forged a certificate and passed of her death being due to old age. Later scientific analysis of her body tissues in August 1998 showed that she had died of morphine poisoning. In the few days before her death, Shipman had persuaded Mrs Grundy to take part in a research project into the ageing process, allegedly to be conducted by Manchester University. It emerged later that this was a hoax so he could obtain a sample of her signature, which he used in an attempt to forge a will. This also created an excuse to visit her at home. She visited him on 23rd June, to have her ears syringed and told her that he needed a blood sample for the research project which must be taken early in the morning. He arranged to visit her at about 8.30am the next morning. The following day she was due to attend Werneth House but she did not arrive. Friends and colleagues there became concerned as this was out of character for Mrs Grundy and two of them, Mr John Green and Mr Ronald Pickford, went to her house at about midday. They found her lying on the sofa fully dressed. Her body was cold and it was established she was dead. The door to the house was unlocked. They summoned Shipman to the house. Following a perfunctory examination of the body, he said ‘cardiac arrest’, following the test he had a brief discussion with someone in the coroner’s office and it was agreed that a certificate which stated the cause of death to be ‘old age’ would be acceptable. There was no record kept of the conversation with the coroner’s office. When Shipman had left the house Mr Green informed the police, as he was unable to contact Mrs Grundy’s daughter Mrs Angela Woodruff. The officers concerned spoke to Shipman later and he informed them he had called on Mrs Grundy earlier that day because she had been unwell. He did not mention the fact that he had called to take a blood sample. Shipman also told them he had spoken with the coroner’s office and was going to issue a certificate stating that Mrs Grundy had died of natural causes. The police officers took a quick look at the body and on seeing nothing suspicious took no further action. The day after the death Shipman spoke to Mrs Woodruff. He told her that he had seen Mrs Grundy on the day before her death just for ‘a routine thing’. He was vague and mentioned she had chest pains possibly due to indigestion. Shipman said that he had arranged to collect a blood sample the next morning, when he arrived she was not yet dressed. He then said that some old people complain of feeling unwell a few days before they die and then just die. He inferred that this had happened to Mrs Grundy. He handed Mrs Woodruff the Medical Certificate of Cause of Death (MCCD) and said that he had certified the death as being due to old age. Mrs Woodruff’s suspicions were not aroused until she was contacted by the Hamilton Ward legal firm handling her mother’s will. Her own law practice in Warwickhad usually dealt with her mother’s legal affairs. The original will had been lodged with the firm in 1986. Hamilton Ward received a new will the same day that Mrs Grundy died. The new will was badly typed. Mrs Woodruff told the Shipman trial in October: â€Å"My mother was a meticulously tidy person. The thought of her signing a document which is so badly typed didn’t make any sense. The signature looked strange, it looked too big. The concept of mum signing a document leaving everything to her doctor was unbelievable.†[1] The police arranged for the exhumation of Mrs Grundys body. The exhumation was vital because forensic evidence was needed to verify the case of death. Dr Rutherford an expert witness pathologist was instructed to conduct the post-mortem examination. The post-mortem was crucial as it would establish time and cause of death, one would also know if Shipmans version of events are true. The results of the post-mortem examination found no natural explanation for Mrs Grundy’s death therefore not supporting Shipmans account. Also questions that were left unanswered for example why had this happened to someone who had been in good health, had been answered. Scientific analysis of the body tissues revealed levels of morphine consistent with the administration of a fatal dose. Dr John Grenville also provided a report and said that there were a number of false entries in the medical records which had been created after the death to give credibility to Shipman’s stories. Firstly that Mrs Grundy was under the weather when he saw her on 23rd June and secondly that Mrs Grundy had been abusing drugs and might have administered the morphine herself. This evidence was very valuable as it proved medical records had been doctored in order to cover Shipmans back. Forensic evidence proved that Shipman forged Mrs Grundys will this was one of the main reasons as to why suspicions were aroused in the first place. Shipman wanted to obtain the whole of Mrs Grundy’s estate, leaving nothing to her daughter and grandchildren. He drafted the will using his own old-fashioned Brother portable typewriter. When the police came to Shipman’s premises and took possession of the typewriter the will was immediately linked to him. This was important as tests would be able to show that if the will had been produced from Shipmans type writer the paper could be matched as well as the ink and tracks that had been used, this evidence would be enough to prove that it had come from that specific printer. Although this evidence was valuable shipman could still argue that someone else had used his type writer. Overall the final product looked painstakingly unprofessional and suspicion would be aroused immediately. Expert hand writing evidence proved them to be forgeries. Shipman forged Mrs Grundy’s signature and dated the will 9th June 1998. On that day he staged a ‘signing and witnessing’ event in his consulting room and must have prepared a document for Mrs Grundy to sign which purported to provide for her consent to take part in some medical research supposedly to be conducted by Manchester University. This document required that Mrs Grundy’s signature should be witnessed by two others, who also had to sign and provide their names, addresses and occupations. While Mrs Grundy was at Shipman’s surgery on 9th June, Shipman appears to have obtained her signature on this document and then called two patients from his waiting room into the consulting room where they completed and signed the witnesses’ part of the document. Shipman must have used this document to copy the three signatures as well as he could. The document would have been valuable to shipman as he had no other means of looking at Mrs Grundys signature. Forensic evidence showed the Shipman had forged the signature as it did not match the style of Mrs Grundys writing and it was blatantly obvious that it was a copy due the fact that Shipman had to break off as he kept looking at the original signature to copy it, it was also noted that the signature Shipman forged was allot bigger than how Mrs Grundy would normally sign. There were clear conclusions drawn from the Forensic evidence as the post-mortem that Mrs Grundys death was a clear case of morphine poisoning. Even without this evidence there were a number of questions that did not add up for instance this was a sudden death of an elderly person in good health. There was no explanation for her death. Mrs Grundys door was unlocked this was also unusual for her as her neighbours mentioned the fact that she was a security conscious person, Shipman implied that Mrs Grundy left the door unlocked after letting him out this vital piece of evidence was a major blow to shipmans case as he had been unable to leave the security system in the condition relatives and friends would have expected it to be. Even though Shipman had altered Mrs Grundys medical records to show she was unwell just before her death and that he suspected she had been abusing drugs her medical records still showed she had been in good health and had no potentially fatal conditions that would harm her. Also the cause of death being ‘old age’, left unanswered question and was quite an inappropriate case of death for a person who had been in such good health. On the 31st January 2000, after six days of deliberation the jury found Shipman guilty of killing 15 patients by lethal injections of diamorphine, and forging the will of Kathleen Grundy. He was sentenced to 15 consecutive life sentences and it was recommended that he never be released. Shipman also received four years imprisonment for forging the will. Two years after his conviction, Home Secretary David Blunkett confirmed the judge’s recommendation that Shipman never be released. Shipman was officially struck off by the General Medical council in Februaury 2002 he consistently denied his guilt, disputing the scientific evidence against him. He never made any statements about his actions. His defence tried, but failed, to have the count of murder of Mrs Grundy, where a clear motive was alleged. Shipman subsequently committed suicide at Wakefield Prison by hanging himself from the window bars of his cell using bed sheets. He was found in his cell at 6:20 am on 13 January 2004, on the eve of his 58th birthday, and was officially pronounced dead at 8:10 am. Bibliography Crime scene to court second edition, Edited by .P.C.White http://www.the-shipman-inquiry.org.uk http://www.geraldengland.co.uk/gx/shipman.htm http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-180566187.htm [1] Mrs Woodruffs evidence in court Royal Ahold: An analysis Royal Ahold: An analysis ROYAL AHOLD: 1. Introduction Headquartered in the Netherlands, Royal Ahold is one of the worlds largest international retail grocery and food service companies. At its peak in 2001, Aholds reported sales and profits were â‚ ¬66.6 billion and â‚ ¬1.1 billion and it operated 5,155 stores in 27 countries with nearly a quarter of a million employees. Ahold was started as a family firm in 1887 by the Heijn family. It was a family-controlled business, operating primarily in the Netherlands for over 100 years. The company went public in 1948. In 1989, Ahold underwent a major transition from a family-controlled to a management controlled firm. This transition resulted in a phenomenal period of success for the firm. It generated over a 1,000% return for its shareholders and had a market capitalization of â‚ ¬30.6 billion by November 2001. In February 2003, Ahold witnessed a reversal of fortunes and suffered a complete meltdown. The firm was in a complete disastrous state with nothing going in their favour: a failed strategy, an accounting scandal, the firing of professional management, and litigation filings from all parts of the world. Shareholders lost most of their returns generated since 1989. Ahold scandal gave Europe a reason to believe that corporate governance and accounting problems were not restricted U.S. only. Ahold became â€Å"Europes Enron† (The Economist, March 1, 2003). It caused Dutch and European policymakers to rethink their approach to corporate governance and accounting policy. The Royal Ahold scandal, along with the accounting fraud at the giant Italian firm Parmalat, caused the European Union (EU) to impose more extensive and rigorous regulation on the financial reporting system and independent audit function within its member nations. The Royal Ahold debacle also reignited the debate re garding the need for more uniform accounting and auditing standards around the globe. In the Netherlands, a committee on corporate governance was installed on March 10, 2003 (Tabaksblat Committee, 2003) to restore the lost confidence in public companies. This report aims at studying the inter-relationships between the lack of corporate governance and of accounting transparency which led to the downfall of Ahold. The subsequent policies and strategies of the firm which aimed at reviving the firm are also aptly covered in the report. 2. The Growth Story: Expanding Boundaries Over the years, Ahold evolved from a single grocery store in 1887 to a food company with a dominant position in the Netherlands. By the mid-1970s, Royal Aholds management realized that for the company to continue to grow it could not limit its operations to The Netherlands. Since the Netherland market was already dominated by Royal Ahold, the companys top executives, who had long been known for their conservative operating and financial policies, announced their plan to expand its operations into other countries. Royal Aholds expansion efforts got off to a slow start but then accelerated rapidly in the 1990s after the company hired a new management team. Until the late 1980s, members of the Heijn family had occupied the key management positions within the firm. In 1987, two grandsons of Albert Heijn, served as Royal Aholds two top executives. Later in 1987 when the brothers retired, a professional management team was hired to replace the Heijn brothers. The team recognized that the quickest way for Royal Ahold to gain significant market share in the grocery retailing industry outside of The Netherlands was to purchase existing grocery chains in foreign countries. To finance their growth-by-acquisition policy, Royal Aholds new executives raised large amounts of debt and equity capital during the 1990s. By 2000, Royal Ahold had purchased retail grocery chains in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Portugal, Scandinavia, South America, and the United States. This aggressive expansion campaign m ade Royal Ahold the third largest grocery retailer worldwide by the turn of the century. At the time, only U.S.-based Wal-Mart and the French firm Carrefour SA had larger annual retail grocery sales than Royal Ahold. Royal Ahold completed its most ambitious acquisition in 2000 when it purchased U.S. Foodservice, a large food wholesaler headquartered in Columbia, Maryland, a suburb of Washington, D.C. Although Royal Ahold had previously purchased several retail grocery chains along the eastern seaboard of the United States, including New England-based Stop Shop, U.S. Foodservice was easily the largest U.S. company it had acquired. The U.S. Foodservice acquisition was also important because it signalled the companys commitment to becoming a significant participant in the food wholesaling industry. In 2003, after purchasing two smaller U.S.-based food distributors, Royal Ahold ranked as the second largest food wholesaler in the United States—Houston-based Sysco Corporation was the largest. In fact, the three U.S. acquisitions caused food wholesaling to be the companys largest source of revenue, accounting for slightly more than one-half of its annual sales. The companys more than 4,000 retail grocery stores located in 27countries accounted for the remainder of its annual sales. 3. Problems Due to Expansion The aggressive growth strategy adopted by the new professional management gave rise to a number of unexpected and unanticipated problems. Among these the major problems were caused primarily due to the expansion in the global regions. The differences in the cultural norms hampered the ability of the management to manage its worldwide retail grocery operations. As the firm ventured into new markets, especially the markets outside of Western Europe and the United States, it faced new challenges in the face of wide range of laws, regulations and cultural differences. The management team also faced difficulty in dealing with human resource policies regarding hiring, appraisal, and other employee benefits. The policies which were successful in The Netherlands failed to live up to the expectations of the new managers and employees in the countries of Asia, Latin America and South America. Furthermore the cultural norms of grocery shopping among the consumers in global markets also exacerbated the misery of the firm. Some consumers out rightly rejected the â€Å"Dutch: idea and way of organizing the grocery store. The consumers also did not appreciate the idea of â€Å"foreign invader† replacing the local grocery stores which existed there for years. 4. Response towards the Problems and Further Issues Since the problems were primarily the result of cultural and social issues, the management at Ahold decided upon the strategy of using the management personal of the local grocery chains and retaining them when those chains were acquired by Ahold. The new mangers were empowered with the authority to make major decisions. The Royal Ahold ambitious plan to become a major player in the wholesaling segment of the huge food industry in the US gave rise to new problems. Most of the company officials were unfamiliar with that segment. Therefore they adopted the â€Å"hands-off† mindset to the acquisition and depended primarily on the executives of U.S. Foodservice who were retained following the buyout to oversee the subsidiarys day-to-day operations. But the firm adopted a policy of following the same rigorous performance standards that were imposed on the companys domestic operations. The companys established goal of 15% annual growth rate in profits was used to decide upon the annual sales targets for each of the companys operating unit in Netherland and also at global locations. The units were pressurised to achieve their target and there were significant rewards on meeting the specified targets. But due to increased competition and the relatively lower profit margins within the food industry prevented many of those units from achieving the annual earnings goals that had been assigned to them.  ­Ã‚ ­Ã‚ ­Ã‚ ­Ã‚ ­Ã‚ ­5. Accounting Issues During the fiscal 2002 audit of Royal Ahold, Deloitte Accountants uncovered evidence suggesting that the companys consolidated revenues had been inflated and overstated. When Royal Ahold invested in a foreign company, it often acquired exactly a 50 percent ownership interest in the given company. Nevertheless, Royal Ahold would fully consolidate the companys financial data in its annual financial statements.Dutch accounting rules at the time permitted a parent company to fully consolidate the financial data of a joint venture company if the parent could control that firms operations. Such control could be evidenced by a more than 50 percent ownership interest in the joint venture company or by other means. Royal Ahold persuaded their Deloitte auditors by providing them with â€Å"control letters† officially signed by the officials of joint venture companies. This was accomplished by taking the officials to their side by bribing them. Further in order to placate the companys executives, the Royal Aholds management team signed â€Å"side letters† addressed to the companys executives of the JV. These letters affirmed that the decision making was mutual rather than by Ahold exclusively. Thus for Dutch accounting purposes, the joint ventures operating results should have been â€Å"proportionately consolidated† in Aholds annual financial statements. Apart from such improper accounting, Royal Ahold was also accused of not sharing the full information among the stakeholders. It did not reveal its obligations to purchase the ownership interests of certain investors in those companies. This was because of the default on the part of the joint venture companies to pay off their outstanding debt. Fraudulent Accounting at U.S. Foodservice Deloitte Accountants U.S. affiliate, Deloitte Touche, audited the financial statements of U.S. Foodservice after that company was acquired by Royal Ahold in 2000. Before the acquisition, KPMG was its auditor. Deloitte uncovered anomaly in the account books which distorted the consolidated net income of Ahold group. Subsequent investigation revealed that US food Service had misrepresented their financial statements for several years before the acquisition. The misrepresentation was because of improper accounting of the â€Å"promotional allowances.† Since the food wholesaling industry is intensely competitive, so the profit margins on their sales are relatively small. This led to the concept of â€Å"promotional allowances† (refund on purchases) being paid to food wholesalers by their suppliers or vendors. Another common practice or rather malpractice was â€Å"front-loading† promotional allowances. This means accounting for all the allowances prior to its actual period. The absence of proper internal controls over promotional allowances provided an opportunity for dishonest employees to overstate those allowances for accounting purposes. 6. The Aftermath In 2003 when the company issued the restated financial statements for the preceding there years, the fraud was uncovered. The net income figures for the years 2000, 2001 and 2003 had been overstated by 17.6%, 32.6% and 88.1% respectively. The corresponding figures for the reported revenues were 20.8%, 18.6% and 13.8%. Soon after the disclosures were made the regulatory agencies, law authorities, investment companies and other stakeholders began seeking more information regarding the fraud. Following the public disclosure both Dutch and U.S. law enforcement authorities filed criminal charges against the company and several of its former executives. Upon investigation, the responsibilities for the fraud lay on the top executives of the firm. The so called â€Å"professional management† which replaced the Heijn-family management in the 1990s were the forces responsible for the crisis. They over estimated their growing potential and set unrealistic targets at the company level. These targets where passed on to the individual units which were pressurised to achieve these unrealistic targets by hook or by crook. This was further enhanced by a significant level of rewards attached to the meeting of targets. Role of the Auditor Though it was because of the Aholds auditor Deloitte that the crisis was finally ended, but it cane under severe criticism for letting this fraud flourish to the extent it had reached. There were many lawsuits filed against Deloitte for the shear reason of negligence on their part which required them to prove their integrity. The loosely organized operating units under Ahold group made the auditing task a tough one. Regulatory Bodies The following controversy also revolved around the inefficiency and loopholes of the present in the regulatory system. The Ahold case re-affirmed the need for cooperation among the different regulatory bodies across countries. This was evident in the wake of rapid globalization which had taken place in the 1990s. Also the need for a common framework of regulations was further enhanced to maintain the comparability aspect of the account books across globe. 7. The Verdict The fraud charges against the Royal Ahold corporate house were finally settled in September 2004. The verdict required the firm to pay a fine of 8 million Euros. Further after investigation the Royal Aholds former executives (CFO and CEO) were found guilty and were penalized as well as were sentenced to four to nine months of imprisonment 8. The Road to Recovery program Press release is issued by Royal Ahold N.V â€Å"Our highest priority now is to rebuild the value of our company. We will do everything in our power to create a company of which you can once again be proud. Reinforcing accountability, controls and corporate governance Ahold is replacing a decentralized system of internal controls that had many weaknesses with a one-company system with central reporting lines. Internal audit will not only report to the CEO, but also to the Audit Committee of the Supervisory Board. In addition, Ahold has nominated Peter Wakkie to the position of Chief Corporate Governance Counsel on the Executive Board, to serve as the driving force behind improved internal governance policies and practices, for legal compliance as well as conformance to ethical and social standards. †